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Due to rapid advances in technology, companies are spending record amounts of money on 
training as they seek to increase employee skills (Armour 1999). Because managers believe 
that corporate fraud is a growing problem, an important skill for all employees should be the 
ability to recognize the risk factors that are frequently associated with fraud. A number of 
instructional cases have been developed that focus on the problems of employee fraud and 
unethical management practices. Training materials and professional standards now include 
more detailed information on the subject of fraud and the auditor's responsibility, as well as 
management's responsibility, with respect to the detection of fraud. The next logical step is 
to assess employee training on this topic. In particular, can employees recognize risk factors 
when they are embedded in an actual instance of misappropriation of assets? We offer a case, 
based on an actual instance of misappropriation of assets, that may be used as a corporate 
training assessment technique (CTAT). Since training dollars are an important resource allo­
cation decision, assessment of the training that is provided to employees is essential. Further, 
since effective teaching produces learning, then evaluation of learning is critical to assessing 
teaching effectiveness. We also include instructions for using the CTAT, teaching notes, and 
suggestions for developing additional instructional cases. 
\ 
INTRODUCTION 
Due to rapid advances in technology, companies are spending record amounts of money on 
training as they seek to increase employee skills and to boost retention (Armour 1999). 
Armour notes that employers spent $60.7 billion on training in the United States in 1998, 
which is a 26 percent increase from 1993. Wexley and Latham (1991) claim that almost all 
private and public organizations have formal training and development programs. These 
authors noted that some organizations spend as much as 15 percent of total payroll on these 
activities. 
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Corporate managers know that adequate training for employees can decrease the entity's lia­
bility risk, as well as the potential for error, fines and penalties (Clarke 1998; Linares 1999). 
To decrease an entity's vulnerability to misappropriation of assets, an important skill for all 
employees should be the ability to recognize risk factors that are frequently associated with 
this type of employee fraud. Further, since many corporate executives, managers, fraud 
detection experts, and researchers believe that corporate fraud is a growing problem, this 
should be an important topic for employee training. 
Jurinski and Lippman (1999) note that most fraudulent activities are discovered through 
internal controls, by other employees noticing fraud, or by internal auditors. However, cor­
porate managers who have responded to the KPMG fraud surveys indicate that they are less 
confident in their ability to recognize fraudulent activities. In the 1993 study, 96 percent of 
the managers who participated in the survey indicated they were knowledgeable about the 
ways in which fraud can occur in an organization. That number dropped to 84 percent in 
1995, and to 80 percent in 1998. At the same time, approximately 75 percent of the man­
agers indicated that they consider fraud to be a major problem for business and about two­
thirds of the respondents believe the incidence of fraud will increase. 
An equally important incentive for organizations to train employees on the topic of misap­
propriation of assets is the magnitude of losses that result from employee misbehavior. 
Calhoun and Luizzo (1992) point out that the cost of economic crime in 1990 was at least 
$114 billion, that one dollar is lost to external crime vis-a-vis eight dollars to internal crime, 
and that one out of three employees is involved in some type of fraud. However, it is diffi­
cult to detect unethical (or illegal) behavior such as fraud while the activity is in progress. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a corporate training assessment technique (CTAT) 
that may be used to appraise corporate training on the topic of fraud. This CTAT was devel­
oped using the risk factors and procedures for assessing risk that may arise from misappro­
priation of assets, identified in paragraphs 18-25 of SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in 
a Financial Statement Audit, (AICPA 1997). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a literature review 
on studies that examine misappropriation of assets and red flags; section three discusses 
training and assessment techniques. The following section offers suggestions and conclu­
sions. The Appendix contains a case, developed as a corporate training assessment tech­
nique, which includes teaching notes to assist the instructor in an evaluation of the effec­
tiveness of corporate training on the topic of misappropriation of assets. 
MISAPPROPRIATION OF ASSETS AND RJ 
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MISAPPROPRIATION OF ASSETS AND RED FLAGS 
Misappropriation of Assets 
KPMG's annual fraud surveys indicate that the most common type of fraud is misappropri­
ation of assets. Nonnan Inkster, President of KPMG Investigation and Security in Toronto, 
believes that many factors in current business environments - such as downsizing, de-layer­
ing, and sophisticated technology - can create opportunities for fraud (Gauthier 1995). For 
example, when a company downsizes, layers of management oversight and control are elim­
inated. This usually results in more responsibility for fewer managers. In such instances, 
managers might have more opportunities to override internal controls, which would make 
the detection of misappropriation of assets more difficult. 
SAS No. 82, paragraph 20, notes that the auditor is not required to plan the audit to detect 
employee dissatisfaction or adverse relationships that may exist between the entity and its 
employees. However, if the auditor does become aware of such problems, then the auditor 
should take these into consideration when assessing the risk of misappropriation of assets. 
SAS No. 82 offers several examples of potential problems: (1) anticipated future layoffs 
that are known to the workforce, (2) employees with access to assets susceptible to misap­
propriation who are known to be dissatisfied, or (3) known unusual changes in behavior or 
lifestyle of employees with access to assets susceptible to misappropriation. 
Accounting researchers have examined the topic of fraud and fraudulent activity from a vari­
ety of perspectives and have employed a variety of research methodologies in an attempt to 
better understand and explain this problem. The majority of these studies have focused on 
misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting rather than misstatements arising 
from misappropriation of assets (Heiman-Hoffman et al. 1996; Ponemon 1994; Hooks et al. 
1994; Johnson et al. 1993; Matsumura and Tucker 1992; Uecker et al. 1981; Baron et al. 
1977). Recently, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) sponsored a study on fraud (Beasley et al. 1999). This study examines instances of 
alleged fraudulent financial reporting by SEC registrants reported in SEC Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases for the period 1987-1997. The report identifies key com­
pany and management characteristics that could help auditors recognize warning signs. 
Seidman (1990) noted that not many studies have been reported on the topic of fraud. His 
explanation for so few studies on this topic is that such public infonnation might encourage 
more individuals to commit fraud - that is, the information might teach others how to com­
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mit fraud. Hollinger and Clark (1983) note that although relatively few researchers have 
empirically examined employee theft, several theoretical models have been developed to 
explain this problem of employee misbehavior: (1) external financial pressures, (2) work­
place inequities, and (3) general moral laxity. 
Seidman's (1990) study of fraud, an example of the first paradigm, used a survey instrument 
to gain insights pertaining to more than 500 cases of fraud. Seidman was able to develop a 
profi Ie for the typical perpetrator, a description of commonly used schemes, and a summa­
ry of the methods used by perpetrators to avoid detection. Seidman claims that the outside 
activities of employees, their lifestyles, and their financial stresses all require careful and 
continuous scrutiny. 
The second paradigm explains employee theft as an attempt by the employee to resolve var­
ious (perceived) workplace inequities. Fowler (1996) suggests that management style is fre­
quently at fault in these situations, which can include management not listening to employ­
ee suggestions, employee perceptions of inadequate pay, employee beliefs that they are the 
subject of unfair treatment, and management ignoring outstanding employee achievement. 
A number of studies examine the third category, which is also referred to as the deterrence 
doctrine. This theory assumes that the perceived threat of sanctions influences personal 
behavior, and has been investigated within a variety of contexts. Hollinger and Clark (1983) 
examined misappropriation of assets based on the deterrence doctrine. Randomly selected 
employees from three different industry sectors were asked to self-report their involvement 
in a number of property theft activities. The results indicate that the magnitude of employ­
ee theft is related to both the perceived certainty and severity of organizational sanctions. 
However, younger employees are not as deterrable as their older counterparts, especially 
under conditions of both high certainty and high severity of punishment. 
Matsumura and Tucker (1992) investigated a form of the deterrence doctrine in an account­
ing setting by developing an experiment using game theory. The game involved one deci­
sion by the manager and two by the auditor. Within this context, the researchers investigat­
ed the effects of penalties, lawsuits, and loss of reputation. The results indicate that increas­
ing the auditor's penalty decreased fraud; increasing the audit fee resulted in less fraud; and 
increased testing decreased fraud. 
In other studies, researchers have found additional factors that may serve as a deterrent to 
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tem within a corporation. After a review of the relevant literature, they concluded that whis­
tle-blowing may be used as an effective internal control mechanism to deter fraud. They 
suggested that this represents a rational approach to deterrence since fraud involves con­
cealment whereas good communication fosters an open environment. Parilla et al. (1988) 
examined the deterrent effect of pre-employment screening and the threat of punishment. 
This study found that, across industries, organizations vary in terms of victimization from 
theft and in terms of the deterrent effect of controls to reduce organizational theft. 
Another fonn of deterrence is the presence of internal auditors in an organization. Welch et 
al. (1996) noted that the internal audit function restricts the ability of perpetrators to access 
a wide variety of accounts in sustaining a fraud. These authors analyzed 2,573 reported 
cases involving the misappropriation of assets in both the public and private sectors, focus­
ing on the victims of the fraud, the characteristics of the perpetrators, the schemes that were 
used, and the methods of detection. The results indicate that poor company attitudes (con­
trol environment) toward existing controls helped the perpetrators commit the fraud. These 
authors also found that when proper separation of duties was lacking, when employees 
lacked sufficient competence, and when employees were able to manipulate documentation 
(internal controls), the probability of fraud increased significantly. Weak internal controls 
were often used to the advantage of the perpetrator. 
Barton et al. (1996) suggest that not-for-profit entities (such as volunteer, religious, and 
charitable organizations) are particularly susceptible to an occurrence of fraud for a number 
of reasons. First, the operating environment of a not-for-profit usually does not have the 
internal controls nonnally found in for-profit entities. Second, the management team and 
the boards of directors of not-for-profits often believe that their charitable mission somehow 
insulates them from fraudulent activity. Third, not-for-profit entities are often managed by 
a single individual who has a dominant personality. When a dominant manager is combined 
with a typically all-volunteer board of directors, the results can be disastrous. Barton et al. 
(1996) report on such an instance in their case study of a not-for-profit entity where the 
director misused over $244,000. The authors note that the most serious problem for this not­
for-profit entity was the lack of a strong internal control structure. 
Several researchers and forensic accountants have concluded that purchasing fraud (i.e., 
fraudulent disbursement of funds) is the most prevalent method employees use to misap­
propriate assets (Robertson 1997; Thornhill 1996; Levy 1985). Thornhill (1996), a forensic 
accountant, notes that purchasing fraud fits into the broad category of input tampering, 
which involves the entry of false or fraudulent data into a computer and can include data that 
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have been altered, forged, or counterfeited. Thornhill (1996) suggests that the persons who 
most often perpetrate a purchasing fraud are trusted, authorized computer users, who have 
either neutralized or avoided any controls that are in place. 
Red Flags 
It is difficult to detect the misappropriation of assets while the fraudulent activity IS In 
progress. As Albrecht (1996) points out, it is not an event that is normally witnessed first­
hand. Rather, it is " ... a crime shrouded in ambiguity, and is sometimes difficult even to 
determine whether or not a crime has actually been committed" (p.26). Too frequently the 
scheme is discovered by accident. Green and Calderon (1996) believe, however, that "red 
flags" can create crucial pieces of evidence in signaling the likelihood of fraud. Further, 
they argue that the internal auditors are optimally positioned to identify and assess any red 
flags that are present. 
According to Uretsky (1980), red flags are situational indicators that suggest the auditor 
should be more watchful than normal. When more than one red flag is present, the auditor 
should move from professional skepticism to suspicion. Albrecht et al. (1980) conducted an 
extensive review of existing fraud-related literature to identify the individual and organiza­
tional factors (red flags) that might be used by auditors to detect fraud. These authors 
acknowledged that a single definition of fraud was problematic, and concluded that the fol­
lowing definition was preferable for their study. Fraud is: (1) improper actions resulting in 
a material misstatement of the financial statements and is harmful to shareholders or credi­
tors; (2) improper actions resulting in the defrauding of the consumer public (such as false 
advertising); (3) embezzlement and defalcations perpetrated by employees against their 
employers; or (4) other improper actions such as bribes, kickbacks, violations of regulatory 
agency rules, and failure to maintain an adequate internal control system. 
Albrecht et al.'s (1980) study resulted in a Iist of 87 red flags for fraud that were divided into 
two categories: (l) factors that motivate individuals to commit fraud on behalf of the com­
pany (e.g., fraudulent financial statements), and (2) factors that motivate individuals to com­
mit fraud against the company (e.g., misappropriation of assets). A number of studies or 
surveys have examined or added to Albrecht et al.'s list (Albrecht and Romney 1986; Pincus 
1989; Loebbecke et at. 1989; Beasley 1996; Heiman-Hoffman et at. 1996; Weisbom and 
Norris 1997; Summers and Sweeney 1998; and the annual KPMG Fraud Surveys). 
Albrecht and Romney (1986) empirically analyzed the predictive ability of the 87 red flags 
identified in Albrecht et al.'s (1980) study. Results suggest that only about one-third of the 
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~d the predictive ability of the 87 red flags 
Its suggest that only about one-third of the 
87 red flags were significant predictors of fraud where financial statements were materially 
misstated. Several of the red flags that were significant predictors were: (I) failure to 
require executives to'take vacations of more than one or two days at a time; (2) too much 
trust in key executives (overlooking controls); (3) inadequate internal controls or failure to 
enforce controls; and, (4) poor accounting records. 
Pincus (1989) utilized a field experiment to examine the efficacy of a red flags question­
naire. The author identified a red flags questionnaire as an audit tool that is designed to help 
auditors assess the risk of materially misstated financial statements on ordinary audit 
engagements. The subjects were 137 mid-level auditors in a large CPA finn, with an aver­
age of 18 months experience being in charge of fieldwork for their clients. Approximately 
half of the auditors assessed a case where the financial statements were materially misstat­
ed due to fraud and the other half assessed a parallel case with no material misstatements. 
The results indicate that the auditors who used a red flags questionnaire to aid them in fraud 
risk assessment considered a more comprehensive and uniform set of potential fraud indi­
cators than did those subjects who did not use a questionnaire. The author utilized a hypo­
thetical case, and acknowledged that using a fraud case developed from a real situation 
should increase the likelihood that the results of the experiment would generalize to an actu­
al audit situation. 
Based on SAS No. 53 (superseded by SAS No. 82), Loebbecke et at. (1989) utilized a sur­
vey to study auditors' experience with material irregularities. The subjects were 165 audit 
partners of KPMG who had one or more experiences with a material irregularity (either a 
material defalcation or material misstatement of financial statements). Each subject 
described an irregularity with which (s)he had experience. The results indicate that red flags 
were present in a large proportion of the cases of material management fraud. As in prior 
research, the authors found that"...where controls are weak, a significant condition exists 
that would allow either management fraud (misstated financial statements), a defalcation, or 
an error to occur" (p. 25). 
Heiman-Hoffman et at. (1996) utilized a survey to query 130 auditors regarding their opin­
ion of some warning signals of fraud. SpecificalIy, the auditors were asked to rank 30 poten­
tial warning signs as to their relative importance in spotting fraudulent financial reporting. 
The auditors who participated in this study were from several offices of one of the (then) six 
largest accounting finns. Those who responded to the survey considered client dishonesty 
to be the most important red flag. Overall, the results are consistent with prior research in 
that a weak control environment is an important indicator of fraudulent financial reporting 
activities by management. 
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Weisborn and Norris' (1997) study used the 87 red flags that were validmed in Albrecht and 
Romney's (1986) study and applied them to 30 well-known and relatively infamous cases of 
fraudulent financial reporting that were included in the text, Contemporary Auditing: Issues 
and Cases by Knapp (1986). The results of this study suggest thm dishonest or unethical 
management is the most important red flag for detecting management fraud, followed by: 
(2) too much trust in key executives (overriding controls); (3) domination of the company 
by one or two strong individuals; and (4) inadequate internal controls or failure to enforce 
controls. 
Summers and Sweeney ( 1998) focused on the association between financial statement fraud 
and a specific risk factor that was not identified as a "red flag" in SAS No. 82 or in prior 
research. These authors claim that insider trading should be an important risk factor for 
auditors who are attempting to detect fraud and to regulators who are monitoring insider 
trading. Specifically, Summers and Sweeney hypothesized that durilig the period of fraud­
ulent financial repOlting by entity officials, insiders in the company will strategically reduce 
their net position in the entity's stock. The results indicate that insiders in companies with 
fraudulent financial statements did in fact reduce their net position in the entity's stock 
through a high level of stock sales activity. 
SAS No. 82 provides examples of red flags (risk factors) believed to be associated with mis­
statements arising from misappropriation of assets. This Statement identifies two categories 
of risk factors: (a) the general susceptibility of assets to misappropriation, and (b) specific 
control weaknesses. The initial category pertains to the nature of an entity's (lssets and the 
degree to which they are subject to theft, while the latter pertains to the lack of controls 
designed to prevent or detect the misappropriation of assets (AICPA 1997, para. 18). Table 
I provides a list of the two groups of risk factors derived from SAS No. 82. 
TRAINING AND ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES 
A number of instructional cases, which describe employee fraud and unethical management 
practices, have been developed to train employees in the detection of risk factors that are fre­
quently associated with the misappropriation of assets. Training materials and professional 
standards now include more detailed information on the subject ofJraud and the auditor's 
responsibility, as well as management's responsibility, with respect to the detection of fraud. 
The next logical step should be to assess employee training on this topic - did the employ­
ees learn what you taught them? In particular, can employees recognize risk factors when 
they are embedded in an actual instance of misappropriation of assets? 
Table 1 Risk Factors Re 
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Table 1 Risk Factors Relating to Misappropriation of Assets 
a. Risk Factors Relating to Susceptibility of Assets to Misappropriation: 
• Large amounts of cash on hand 
• Inventory characteristics such as small size, high demand, high value 
• Easily convertible assets 
• Fixed asset characteristics, such as small size, marketability 
b. Risk Factors Relating to Controls: 
• Lack of management oversight 
• No screening procedures for employees with access to vulnerable assets 
• Lack of appropriate segregation of duties 
• Lack of appropriate authorization and approval of transactions 
• Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or fixed assets 
• Lack of documentation for transactions 
• Lack of mandatory vacations for employees
 
Source: Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82 (AICPA 1997).
 
Corporate training assessment techniques (CTATs) are used to assess the gap between what 
the instructor has taught and what the employees have learned. If the instructor discovers 
that a gap does exist, that employees do not recognize these risk factors (or only a few), then 
the expectation is that the instructor would adjust the training methodology that was used to 
ensure that the learning objectives are met. For example, if the training was delivered via 
lecture format, the instructor might choose cases, instructional videos, or a combination of 
these methods to help employees recognize a wider variety of the risk factors that signal 
employee misbehavior. 
According to Cottell and Harwood (1998), assessment can provide important and timely 
feedback so that instructors may change course coverage and/or teaching approaches to 
improve student learning. Further, Angelo and Cross (1993) believe that using assessment 
techniques on a regular basis provide students (employees) the necessary feedback to 
become more self-assessing, more self-directed, and more effective learners. 
Further, training (educational) assessment may improve the quality of learning (Angelo and 
Cross 1993). Rebele et al. (1998) describe the underlying premise of assessment techniques 
as follows. Because effective teaching produces learning, an evaluation of learning is essen­
tial to assessing teaching effectiveness. In general, corporate training assessment techniques 
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(CTATs) have two characteristics: (I) they encourage both trainers and employees to engage 
in a constructive discussion of learning, and (2) they promote learning of the subject matter 
while providing feedback on teaching effectiveness (Beard 1993). CTATs should be 
anonymous exercises so that employees will be more likely to provide corporate trainers 
with unbiased feedback on what, how much, and how well the employees are learning. 
The Springer Junction case (see Appendix) is constructed from an actual instance of misap~  
propriation of assets that was the result of a governmental employee creating fictitious 
invoices. This case may be used to reinforce and assess employee learning subsequent to 
training on internal controls and fraud, as well as any instructional training that incorporates 
fraud awareness, and the risk factors that are typically present in actual instances of misap­
propriation of assets. The instructor may use the case as a stand-alone CTAT, or it may be 
used in conjunction with other instructional cases that focus on employee fraud and unethi­
cal management practices (Dwyer 1998, Green and Calderon 1994, Mills 1995). Surveys 
of corporate training directors indicate that case studies have repeatedly received high rat­
ings for developing problem-solving skills (Kaupins 1997). In other research, case studies 
have been shown to help develop critical thinking and judgment abilities (Anthony 1974; 
Subotnik 1987; Campbell and Lewis 1991). The intent of these instructional tools is for 
employees to build their recognition skills of risk factors associated with the misappropria­
tion of assets, and for instructors to assess the effectiveness of this method of instructional 
delivery as it pertains to learning about fraud risk factors. 
Such instruction and reinforcement should help employees gain expertise in the area of red 
flags and employee misbehavior. For example, Bonner and Pennington's (1991) results sug­
gest that instruction is important for learning and for good task performance by experts. 
Bonner (1990) noted that task-specific knowledge aided experienced professionals in mak­
ing better decisions. Based on these results, Bonner suggested that training and decision 
aids could be useful in improving performance. The timing of this instruction appears to be 
important, also, based on Bonner et al.'s (1997) finding that instruction prior to experienc­
ing an event is instrumental to improved learning. Johnson et al. (1993) conclude that to 
successfully detect fraud one must not only continually acquire new knowledge, but also 
learn how to use what they already know. 
Bonner and Walker (1994) studied the effectiveness of various combinations of instruction 
and experience (practice and feedback) in producing this knowledge. Their results suggest 
that combinations of instruction and no experience, or instruction and practice without feed­
back do not produce knowledge. However, practice with explanatory, feedback was helpful. 
Choo's (1996) results show that repeated e 
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Choo's (1996) results show that repeated exposure may be an alternative proxy for audit 
expertise in a going-concern task, which supports earlier findings that novice auditors gain 
expertise by prolonged practice (Spires 1991). 
SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Springer Junction case in the Appendix represents an actual case of misappropriation 
of assets that may be used to help employees practice the recognition of common clues that 
are frequently associated with employee fraud. If a trainer wishes to use several fraud-spe­
cific CTATs throughout a training course, additional cases may be developed that are simi­
lar. Any actual instance of fraud may be taken from a newspaper, news journal, or business 
journal. Next, the instructor would select three risk factors from SAS No. 82 to include in 
the scenario. Perhaps the instructor might repeat a risk factor or two that was used in this 
CTAT to determine whether the employees could recognize that risk factor(s) in a different 
setting. 
The annual fraud surveys conducted by KPMG continue to document the fact that employ­
ee misconduct is a growing concern to the business community, which implies that the topic 
is relevant for corporate training if employees are to be properly prepared for this threat in 
their work environment. Employees may greatly benefit from periodic instruction on the 
risk factors that are commonly associated with the misappropriation of assets, such as those 
included in SAS No. 82. Similarly, trainers should routinely assess the training that is being 
provided to employees to increase the efficacy of such instruction. 
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APPENDIX 
Department of Finance 
City of Springer Junction 
\ 
Instructions for Trainees: The case mate. 
Organizational Chart for a governmental office. 1 
listing of departmental personnel, along with thei 
the Background Information and Organizational ( 
that is contained in the Scenario. Using these pi 
questions that follow the scenario. Each questior 
each question to the best of your ability. There an 
situation. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 
Stan Wandell was pleased. He recently accept. 
Junction, a city with a population just over 60,0 
past several decades, and collected over $80 mi 
fiscal year. 
Stan's picture has already appeared on the frol 
Junction newspaper. In the interview for that fe, 
of the Finance Department and identified a m 
However, Stan noted that initially he planned tl 
day-to-day concerns he had about the Departme 
First, he plans to streamline procedures in the I 
are rarely used. He also wants to improve the e 
can be provided quickly when needed by citizl 
siders' confidence in the Department. Stan is p~ 
employee turnover. Five of the seven employee 
less than a year. Stan has been told that the prior 
9nented, and that this may have caused Departr 
Stan noted that the City does not have an inter 
Quigley & Matherson, CPAs has been the Ind 
